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THE  DOUBLE-EDGED  SWORD  OF
PARENS  PATRIAE :  STATUS  OFFENDERS  AND  THE
PUNITIVE  REACH  OF  THE  JUVENILE
JUSTICE SYSTEM
Madison C. Jaros*
[T]here may be grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of both worlds: that he
gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment
postulated for children.1
INTRODUCTION
To many, ditching school, feuding with parents, and staying out late are
hallmarks of adolescence.  In 2014, however, these acts and other similar
ones formed the basis of one out of every eleven juvenile court cases in
America.2  Adolescents convicted in these cases are known as status offend-
ers—juveniles who have committed “a noncriminal act that is considered a
law violation only because of [the] youth’s status as a minor.”3  Although the
particular offenses designated as status offenses vary by state, the most com-
monly adjudicated status offenses include truancy, ungovernability, and cur-
few violations, as well as running away from home and underage alcohol
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2020; Bachelor of Business
Administration in Marketing and Political Science, University of Notre Dame, 2017.  I
would like to thank Professor Jimmy Gurulé, for his valuable insight and guidance as I
attempted to craft my many thoughts on this topic into a coherent argument.  I would like
to thank the members of the Notre Dame Law Review for their dedication to editing this
Note.  Finally, I would like to thank my friends and family for their constant support in all
things law school.  Thank you especially to my parents, Steven and Elaine Jaros—I owe
every success to the two of you.
1 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966).
2 MAHSA JAFARIAN & VIDHYA ANANTHAKRISHNAN, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, JUST KIDS:
WHEN MISBEHAVING IS A CRIME (2017), https://www.vera.org/when-misbehaving-is-a-
crime#introduction.  Because of the significant procedural differences in status offense
adjudication between and within states, it is likely that this figure is an underestimate. Id.
3 OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, STATUS OFFENDERS 1
(2015), https://www.ojjdp.gov/mpg/litreviews/Status_Offenders.pdf.
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consumption.4  Since status offenses are not technically criminal acts, those
who commit these offenses are not classified as juvenile delinquents5 by the
juvenile justice system.  As a result, states are not required to guarantee due
process protections to status offenders during their initial disposition hear-
ings—and many do not.6  An adolescent accused of being a status offender
will likely enter her disposition hearing without an attorney;7 she will likely
be adjudicated a status offender by a preponderance of the evidence rather
than by beyond a reasonable doubt;8 and the court that adjudicates her will
likely prevent her from asserting due process rights like the right against self-
incrimination.9
States often justify their refusal to guarantee status offenders due process
by invoking the principle of parens patriae, which embodies the idea that, in
the juvenile justice system, the state should look to rehabilitate juveniles
rather than punish them.10  Under parens patriae, the court is meant to be a
guiding, almost parental, force rather than a punitive one.  Despite this ratio-
nale, status offenders can still be subject to sanction by the court,11 and
therefore are often just as vulnerable to the punitive reach of the juvenile
justice system as their delinquent counterparts.  Indeed, status offenders are
often subject to some of the same sanctions that juvenile delinquents receive:
fines; probation; GPS monitoring; and, in some situations, incarceration, are
all punishments that may follow disposition as a status offender.12  As a
result, status offenders often have little protection against punishment that
may outstrip the severity of their actions.
This Note will argue that, despite the fact that adjudication as a status
offender has the potential to lead to punitive outcomes, the rehabilitative
rationale of parens patriae that lies behind the status offender designation
ensures that juveniles charged under this category are not afforded the pro-
cedural protections that they are due under the Constitution’s Due Process
Clause.  This conundrum—that the rehabilitative rationale meant to protect
4 CHARLES PUZZANCHERA & SARAH HOCKENBERRY, NAT’L CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE,
JUVENILE COURT STATISTICS 2010, at 66 (2013), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/
grants/244080.pdf.
5 Juvenile delinquency is defined as a “violation of a law of the United States commit-
ted by a person prior to his eighteenth birthday which would have been a crime if commit-
ted by an adult.” “Juvenile” Defined, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/jm/
criminal-resource-manual-38-juvenile-defined (last visited Feb. 25, 2019).
6 See infra Section II.B.
7 Ashley Goins, Justice for Juveniles: The Importance of Immediately Appointing Counsel to
Cases Involving Status Offenses and Engaging in Holistic Representation of Juveniles in All Cases, 2
FORUM 22, 23 (2015) (“Most courts . . . refuse to appoint an attorney to a status offense
case unless the case develops into a contempt case in which the child could face
incarceration.”).
8 See infra note 52.
9 See, e.g., In re Spalding, 332 A.2d 246 (Md. 1975).
10 See infra Section I.A.
11 See Goins, supra note 7, at 33.
12 See infra Section II.B.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-5\NDL512.txt unknown Seq: 3 25-JUN-19 15:29
2019] the  double-edged  sword  of P A R E N S P A T R I A E 2191
juveniles actually leaves them more vulnerable to punishment—is not con-
fined to the status offender context.  Instead, the juvenile system as a whole
suffers from the failures that result from promises of rehabilitation made by a
largely punitive system.  And despite Supreme Court rulings that have pro-
vided due process to juvenile delinquents, the juvenile system’s treatment of
status offenders illustrates that any promise of rehabilitation from the juve-
nile justice system is functionally a dead letter.  As a result, status offenders
should not simply be afforded due process protections, but instead should be
removed completely from a system that claims not to punish them and can-
not successfully rehabilitate them.
Part I of this Note will provide a brief history of the juvenile justice sys-
tem, its initial rehabilitative goals, and how these rehabilitative goals have
survived despite legal and social shifts.  Part II will discuss the tenuous posi-
tion that status offenders occupy in the juvenile system and the punitive
implications that result from this position.  Part III will discuss the due pro-
cess issues that stem from the juvenile system’s treatment of status offenders.
Finally, Part IV will discuss how the juvenile system’s treatment of status
offenders typifies the problems created by the juvenile system’s adoption of
the parens patriae rationale and why this requires that status offenders be
removed from the juvenile system altogether.  Part IV will then discuss what is
likely to be the most successful replacement for juvenile justice system juris-
diction: the use of preexisting community resources that are better equipped
to accomplish rehabilitative goals.
I. PARENS PATRIAE AND THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
A. Inception: Why the Juvenile Justice System Was Different
In the United States, adjudicating juveniles and adults as separate classes
is a relatively recent phenomenon; the majority of states did not develop dis-
tinct juvenile justice systems until the early twentieth century.13  At that time,
societal beliefs about adolescence and the culpability of juveniles were chang-
ing, and certain groups began championing the idea that adolescents were
fundamentally different from adults—“vulnerable, malleable, and in need of
adult guidance.”14  These beliefs about adolescence ultimately formed the
base rationale for the juvenile system: adolescents were less morally culpable
than adults, and therefore required rehabilitation rather than punishment,
in response to their wrongful acts.15  The juvenile justice system was meant to
provide this rehabilitation and guidance under the philosophy of parens
patriae, literally “parent of the country.”16  Initially a chancery court principle
13 See, e.g., Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order:
The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1083, 1096 (1991).
14 Id. at 1095.
15 Id. at 1097.
16 Emily L. Barth, Comment, Blurring the Lines: When the “Best Interests of the Child” Fall to
the Wayside. An Analysis of Ohio’s Serious Youthful Offender Statute, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 323, 326
(2010).
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that justified state authority over parentless children, parens patriae encom-
passed the idea that the government itself was meant to act as a parent to
wayward youth.17 Parens patriae oriented the juvenile justice system toward a
primary goal of rehabilitation rather than retribution, with the ultimate
objective of “mold[ing] wayward youths into good citizens.”18  Perhaps one
of the best expressions of what the proponents of a separate juvenile system
hoped to achieve comes from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Common-
wealth v. Fisher:
It is to save, not to punish; it is to rescue, not to imprison; it is to subject to
wise care, treatment and control rather than to incarcerate in penitentiaries
and jails; it is to strengthen the better instincts and to check the tendencies
which are evil; it aims, in the absence of proper parental care, or guardian-
ship, to throw around a child, just starting in an evil course, the strong arm
of the parens patriae.19
Because the juvenile system was founded on the fundamental idea that
adolescents were a distinct class with distinct needs, it was designed to deal
with adolescents in a way that was completely different from the way that the
justice system at large dealt with adults.  The rationale of parens patriae per-
meated every aspect of the juvenile system, informing the crimes with which
juveniles could be charged, the structure of juvenile court proceedings, and
the rights that juveniles were afforded in these proceedings.  For example,
because the state considered juvenile courts to be tasked with protecting
rather than punishing adolescents, “juvenile court had a mandate to assume
liberal jurisdiction over the wayward young, much as it might over other help-
less and needy members of society.”20  This meant that juvenile court was not
limited to pursuing crimes committed by juveniles; instead, adolescents could
find themselves in a juvenile court proceeding for “[b]ehavior such as smok-
ing, sexual activity, stubbornness, running away from home, swearing, and
truancy.”21  The structure of juvenile proceedings differed from adult pro-
ceedings as well; juvenile proceedings were more casual than adult proceed-
ings, and were often closed to the public.22  Finally, juveniles were not
provided with the due process protections afforded to adults in criminal tri-
als.23  In the minds of those who created and supported a distinct justice
system for adolescents, there was simply no need for these protections.24
The judge in a juvenile proceeding was not meant to be an agent of the state,
wielding the power to take away a child’s liberty.  Instead, he was meant to be
17 See Ainsworth, supra note 13, at 1098.
18 Id. at 1098–99.
19 Commonwealth v. Fisher, 27 Pa. Super. 175, 182 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1904).
20 See Ainsworth, supra note 13, at 1098.
21 Id.
22 Alicia N. Harden, Rethinking the Shame: The Intersection of Shaming Punishments and
American Juvenile Justice, 16 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 93, 102 (2012).
23 See Barth, supra note 16, at 326.
24 See Ainsworth, supra note 13, at 1100.
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similar to a father figure or a social worker—an advocate.25  For this reason,
an adolescent in juvenile court was not seen as needing due process protec-
tions; because the aim of the juvenile system was to guide rather than punish
her, there was nothing she needed protection from.
B. Development: The “Superpredator” and Due Process Protection for Delinquents
The early twentieth-century idea that juveniles were less morally culpable
than adults and therefore required rehabilitation rather than punishment
was only widely accepted for a little over fifty years.  By the 1960s, parens
patriae had fallen out of favor,26 and the focus of the juvenile system had
gradually shifted “from assessing the social needs of the offender to assessing
the social harm that the offender caused.”27  Like in the early twentieth cen-
tury, societal notions about adolescence—and societal notions about the type
of adolescents who committed crimes—had shifted.  Rather than viewing
juvenile delinquents simply as “wayward” and in need of guidance, the juve-
nile system was increasingly concerned with the punishment of juveniles and
the protection of the community.  These social developments, however, were
coupled with a complete lack of development in juvenile court proceedings.
Although the focus of the juvenile justice system had arguably shifted from
rehabilitation to retribution, juvenile proceedings were still largely informal.
Juvenile delinquents faced the possibility of life sentences, but they were gen-
erally denied basic due process rights in these proceedings.28  As a result,
juvenile delinquents began to challenge the constitutionality of juvenile
court proceedings; the judiciary responded in turn.  Beginning in 1967 with
In re Gault, the Supreme Court extended a number of due process protec-
tions to juvenile delinquents.  Stating that “the condition of being a boy does
not justify a kangaroo court,”29 the In re Gault Court held that juvenile delin-
quents were entitled to notice of the charges against them,30 to counsel,31 to
confrontation and cross-examination,32 and to the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination.33  In 1970, the Supreme Court further held
that, in order to adjudicate an adolescent delinquent, juvenile courts were
required to prove the adolescent’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, rather
than by a preponderance of the evidence.34
As time passed, societal opinions about juvenile offenders grew increas-
ingly negative.  The issue was especially salient in the 1990s with the rise of
25 See Harden, supra note 22, at 102.
26 See Barth, supra note 16, at 326.
27 See Ainsworth, supra note 13, at 1105.
28 See Barth, supra note 16, at 327.
29 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 28 (1967).
30 Id. at 34.
31 Id. at 41.
32 Id. at 55.
33 Id. at 57.
34 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970).
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anxiety surrounding juvenile “superpredators.”35  Largely the creation of
Professor John J. DiIulio Jr. in the 1990s, the theory of the juvenile “super-
predator” warned of “radically impulsive, brutally remorseless youngsters . . .
who murder, assault, rape, rob, burglarize, deal deadly drugs, join gun-toting
gangs and create serious communal disorders.”36  And although DiIulio has
now denounced the “superpredator” theory,37 this view of juvenile delin-
quents as hardened criminals had a lasting effect on their treatment within
the juvenile justice system.  For example, in response to “superpredator” fer-
vor, hundreds of juveniles were given life sentences, and many states made it
easier for juveniles who were as young as thirteen or fourteen years old to be
tried in adult court.38
C. The Survival of Parens Patriae: The Current State of the Juvenile System
In some ways, the Supreme Court’s decisions in In re Gault and related
cases fundamentally altered the juvenile justice system—beyond simply the
provision of due process rights to juvenile delinquents.  As a result of In re
Gault and other cases affirming the right of juvenile delinquents to due pro-
cess, states began transferring more serious juvenile cases to adult court, par-
ing down confidentiality protections provided to juveniles at trial, and
enumerating rationales for the juvenile justice system beyond parens patriae.39
States’ juvenile court proceedings began to look less like an informal discus-
sion between parent and child—the early twentieth-century ideal—and more
like the adult proceedings that early proponents of the juvenile justice system
had rejected.
However, while some aspects of the juvenile justice system fundamentally
changed after In re Gault, others have stayed the same.  Juvenile proceedings
were not transformed into adult criminal proceedings by In re Gault.  Indeed,
the notion of parens patriae is still a fundamental rationale underlying the
juvenile justice system.  States have continued to cite parens patriae as one of
the rationales for their juvenile justice systems, and “[i]n some jurisdictions,
there has been a reluctance among court personnel to introduce elements of
the adversarial system into juvenile court.”40
35 Daniel J. Gibbs, Note, Status Offenses and Dejudicialization: Establishing a Right to Coun-
sel in Informal Diversion Proceedings, 19 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 126, 138 (2015).
36 Elizabeth Becker, As Ex-Theorist on Young ‘Superpredators,’ Bush Aide Has Regrets, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 9, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/09/us/as-ex-theorist-on-young-
superpredators-bush-aide-has-regrets.html.  This fear of “superpredators” was one that
crossed party lines. See C-SPAN, 1996: Hillary Clinton on “Superpredators” (C-SPAN), YOU-
TUBE (Feb. 25, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J0uCrA7ePno.
37 See Becker, supra note 36.
38 Clyde Haberman, When Youth Violence Spurred ‘Superpredator’ Fear, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6,
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/07/us/politics/killing-on-bus-recalls-super-
predator-threat-of-90s.html.
39 See Harden, supra note 22, at 110.
40 Chris E. Marshall et al., The Implementation of Formal Procedures in Juvenile Court
Processing of Status Offenders, 11 J. CRIM. JUST. 195, 197 (1983).
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In addition, despite its comments about “kangaroo court[s],”41 the
Supreme Court has never questioned the position of parens patriae as the
foundation for the juvenile justice system. In re Gault and its progeny did not
reject parens patriae.  Instead, the Court in In re Gault upheld the idea that
children and adults are distinct and require distinct justice systems, declining
“to hold that juvenile delinquency adjudications are the equivalent of crimi-
nal prosecutions.”42  The Court further reinforced the fundamental position
of parens patriae in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, where it held that adolescents
were not entitled to jury trials in juvenile court.43  The McKeiver Court
emphasized that a jury trial was not only unnecessary in juvenile court but
also undesirable; if juvenile delinquents had a right to a jury, the Court
argued, the unique nature of juvenile court proceedings would be at risk.44
McKeiver is not the only case that has reinforced the idea that adoles-
cents are fundamentally different than adults.  Indeed, the idea that the state
has greater power to restrict the liberty interests of youths than it does to
restrict the liberty interests of adults is found in a number of Supreme Court
cases—even those that do not deal directly with the procedures of the juve-
nile system.45  These cases often employ similar rationales to those employed
by early proponents of the juvenile justice system: children are vulnerable,
they lack the judgment of adults and are therefore less culpable, and limiting
youth liberty under the law encourages family unity.46
The staying power of these parens patriae rationales, despite legal and
social shifts, continues to have a significant effect on the treatment of
juveniles under the law.  In some cases, these rationales have protected ado-
lescents from harm.47  However, as evidenced in McKeiver, these rationales
have also led to a denial of basic constitutional rights.  Even more troubling,
the rationale of parens patriae is not uniformly invoked in cases regarding
juveniles.  For example, in Fare v. Michael C., the Supreme Court struck down
the California Supreme Court’s holding that an individual’s status as a juve-
nile requires a more deferential understanding of when the right against self-
incrimination is invoked.48  In essence, the perceived vulnerability of juvenile
offenders allows the state to hold greater control over them, but it does not
41 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 28 (1967).
42 See Ainsworth, supra note 13, at 1114.
43 McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (plurality opinion).
44 Id. at 540.
45 See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) (“The well-being of its children
is of course a subject within the State’s constitutional power to regulate . . . .”); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) (“[T]he power of the state to control the conduct
of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults . . . .”). See generally Lee E.
Teitelbaum & James W. Ellis, The Liberty Interest of Children: Due Process Rights and Their
Application, 12 FAM. L.Q. 153 (1978) (detailing cases in which the Supreme Court has
emphasized that the state has a unique interest in and power over juveniles).
46 See Teitelbaum & Ellis, supra note 45, at 160–63.
47 See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2012) (citing chil-
dren’s education, health, and well-being as concerns underlying child labor laws).
48 Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979).
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necessarily allow them to receive greater accommodations from the court,
even if those accommodations would go to compensating for perceived
vulnerabilities.
The clash between parens patriae and the changes that states made in the
wake of In re Gault makes for a juvenile justice system with a confused sense
of purpose.  An apt illustration of the internal conflict that plagues most
states’ juvenile justice systems comes from the language that states use to
describe what these systems should accomplish.  Many states stress numerous
purposes for their juvenile systems, some of which are seemingly in disagree-
ment.  For example, a state may cite both the purposes of rehabilitation and
punishment, or juvenile guidance and community protection.49  Although
these purposes may not wholly conflict, they are indicative of competing and
often-irreconcilable views regarding juvenile offenders and how they should
be dealt with.
II. STATUS OFFENDERS AND THEIR PLACE IN THE JUVENILE SYSTEM
A. The Danger of Occupying the Middle Ground
Most juvenile justice systems adjudicate cases involving three major clas-
ses of juveniles: abused and neglected children, status offenders, and juvenile
delinquents.50  Although adolescents can be classified in more than one of
these classes, each class is distinct with its own set of proceedings.51  Within
the juvenile justice system, status offenders exist in the tenuous middle
ground between the other two groups.  Unlike abused and neglected chil-
dren, status offenders enter the juvenile system as wrongdoers rather than
victims of wrongdoing.52  However, since status offenses are not classified as
criminal acts, those who commit status offenses also cannot be classified as
delinquents.  As a result, status offenders are not protected by the Supreme
Court rulings that extended due process protections to juvenile delinquents,
such as In re Gault.53
Indeed, since status offenders are not classified as having committed
crimes, the rationale of parens patriae is more prominent in discussions of
their treatment than the treatment of juvenile delinquents.  For example,
49 NAT’L CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 2014 NATIONAL
REPORT 86–88 (Melissa Sickmund & Charles Puzzanchera eds., 2014) (illustrating the mul-
tiple sources that states often pull from when crafting the purpose clauses of their juvenile
justice system legislation, and the varied approaches states take to juvenile justice).
50 Kathleen Michon, Juvenile Court: An Overview, NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legal-
encyclopedia/juvenile-court-overview-32222.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2018).
51 Id.
52 Some argue, however, that adolescents commit status offenses in response to under-
lying trauma or abuse. See JAFARIAN & ANANTHAKRISHNAN, supra note 2.  This information
may imply that status offenders have more in common with abused and neglected children
than with juvenile delinquents, although they are subject to punitive sanctions that abused
and neglected children are never subject to.
53 387 U.S. 1, 44 (1967) (emphasizing that holding requiring protections for juveniles
applied only to delinquency proceedings).
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many states do not classify status offenders as “offenders” at all, but rather as
“Persons in Need of Supervision,” “Children in Need of Care,” or the like,
hearkening back to the early twentieth-century idea that wayward youths
required guidance by the state.54  The parens patriae rationale can also be
found in state legislation creating the status offender designation.55  In addi-
tion, in rulings upholding status offender statutes or designating youths as
status offenders, state courts often cite to the rehabilitative rationale underly-
ing status offenses.56  As a result, parens patriae not only acts as the foundation
for the establishment of status offenses but also acts as the rationale that insu-
lates these proceedings from challenges—due process or otherwise—by
juveniles.
B. The Status Offender’s Path Through the Juvenile Justice System
The unique position of status offenders presents a problem regarding
this class’s treatment in the juvenile system.  Namely, although status offend-
ers are considered to be different than juvenile delinquents, the juvenile jus-
tice system is selective in how it treats status offenders differently.  Despite the
rehabilitative rationale behind status offenses, once an individual is declared
to be a status offender, they are often subject to a number of punitive sanc-
tions.  This concept is best illustrated by detailing a status offender’s experi-
ence in the juvenile system, from his or her initial hearing to the long-term
effects that can follow from his or her adjudication.
Status offense disposition hearings are largely informal.  As previously
mentioned, because status offenses are not considered crimes, adolescents
who are charged with these offenses are often not guaranteed the due pro-
54 Status Offense Issues, JUV. JUST. GEOGRAPHY POL’Y PRAC. & STAT., http://www.jjgps
.org/status-offense-issues (last visited May 16, 2019).
55 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.005(1) (2018) (stating, in a statutory chapter directed
toward status offenders, that the purpose of the chapter was to “achieve the end that a
child coming within the jurisdiction of the court under this chapter may receive the care,
guidance, treatment, and control that will promote the child’s welfare”); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 630.010 (West 2018) (referencing the purposes enumerated in KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 600.010 (West 2018)—which include “making the child a productive citizen . . . by
advancing the principles of personal responsibility, accountability, and reformation”—and
reiterating that these purposes applied to status offenders).
56 See, e.g., K.A.C. v. Commonwealth, No. 2005-CA-002202, 2006 WL 2034300, at *5
(Ky. Ct. App. July 21, 2006) (“[A] further dispositional hearing was undertaken [by the
trial court] not for the purpose of punishing K.A.C., but, rather, to consider the appropri-
ate continuing disposition to effect the rehabilitation of K.A.C.”); In re E.D., 127 S.W.3d
860, 865 (Tex. App. 2004) (quoting, in reference to the trial court’s modification of a
status offender’s probation, the trial court’s statement that “the Court doesn’t really want
to find [appellant] dead on the side of the street one day; and frankly that’s the direction I
am afraid I see her going . . . . There is no way this Court could put her back on the street”
(alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); State ex rel. Harris v.
Calendine, 233 S.E.2d 318, 326 (W. Va. 1977) (“[S]tatus offenders must be treated in a
fashion consistent with the parens patriae power, namely, they must be helped and not
punished . . . .”).
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cess protections they would receive if they were being charged with a crime as
a juvenile delinquent.57  Additionally, in many states, the standard of proof
for status offense dispositional hearings is a preponderance of the evi-
dence.58  This standard is less stringent than the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard usually used in juvenile delinquency proceedings, and therefore
more likely to result in a guilty disposition.
Once a guilty disposition is laid down, the court often has the discretion
to impose a number of different sanctions, including “fines, involuntary com-
munity service, recursive court involvement, loss of driving privileges, imposi-
tion of curfews, specification of conditions of probation that require students
to meet unrealistic school performance standards, unwarranted disclosures
of personal information, [and] investigations of family dependency and neg-
lect.”59  In some states, once a juvenile is declared a status offender, she can
also be subject to GPS monitoring.60  And although the status offender desig-
nation applies by definition only to juveniles, the punitive outcomes that
accompany adjudication as a status offender can follow an individual past
that period.  For example, the Federal Rules of Evidence do not prohibit a
party from impeaching an individual with evidence of a past adjudication as a
status offender—even a decade after that adjudication occurred.61
In addition, if a status offender lives in one of the thirty states that allows
it, the court can order that she be put on probation.62  The length of this
probation varies widely depending on the state—in Arizona, South Carolina,
and Texas, probation can last until the status offender’s eighteenth birthday;
in California, it can last for up to six months; in Idaho, it can last for up to
57 Erin M. Smith, Note, In a Child’s Best Interest: Juvenile Status Offenders Deserve Procedu-
ral Due Process, 10 L. & INEQ. 253, 259 (1992) (“Left to their discretion, most state courts
have refused to grant status offenders the same procedural protections guaranteed delin-
quents by the Supreme Court.”).
58 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571-41 (West 2018) (Hawaii); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT
§ 350.3 (McKinney 2018) (New York); TENN. R. JUV. P. 211(e) (Tennessee); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 33, § 5315 (2018) (Vermont); In re D.M.C., 503 A.2d 1280, 1282 (D.C. 1986) (District of
Columbia); In re C.B., 865 N.E.2d 1068, 1073 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (Indiana); State ex rel.
D.M.G., 579 So. 2d 525, 528 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (Louisiana); In re Carter, 318 A.2d 269,
283 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1974) (Maryland); In re Jennifer G., 695 N.Y.S.2d 871, 878 (1999)
(New York); In re K., 554 P.2d 180, 183 (Or. Ct. App. 1976) (Oregon).
59 Dean Hill Rivkin, Truancy Prosecutions of Students and the Right [to] Education, 3 DUKE
F. FOR L. & SOC. CHANGE 139, 141 (2011) (footnote omitted).
60 See, e.g., In re A.M., 163 Cal. Rptr. 3d 793, 797 (Ct. App. 2013) (holding that
juveniles adjudicated to be status offenders in California could be subject to GPS monitor-
ing).  Arkansas also allows courts to order that a status offender be subject to GPS monitor-
ing. COAL. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, STATUS OFFENSES: A NATIONAL SURVEY 11 (2015), http://
www.juvjustice.org/sites/default/files/resource-files/Status%20Offenses%20-%20A%20
National%20Survey%20-FINAL%20-%20WEB.pdf.
61 FED. R. EVID. 609(d) (describing the circumstances under which a juvenile adjudica-
tion may be used for impeachment purposes).
62 Linda A. Szymanski, Probation as a Disposition for Status Offenders, NAT’L CTR. FOR JUV.
JUST. SNAPSHOT, Apr. 2006, http://www.ncjj.org/pdf/Snapshots/2006/vol11_no4_proba
tionasdisposition.pdf.
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three years.63  Probation often carries with it a number of requirements that
the status offender must meet over the course of her probation, such as a
mandate that the status offender “regularly attend school[,] obey a court-
imposed curfew,” or earn a GED.64  In some states, if the status offender fails
to meet these requirements, she is at risk of incarceration in a juvenile
facility.65
Historically, status offenders were often subject to incarceration—some-
times for longer periods than their delinquent counterparts.66  In 1974, how-
ever, Congress’s Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA)
looked to prevent the incarceration of status offenders by requiring that
states receiving JJDPA funds work toward the deinstitutionalization of this
group.67  Since then, states have generally complied with the letter of the
JJDPA.68  In practice, however, states have been able to circumvent the
requirement that status offenders not be institutionalized in multiple ways.69
The most commonly used method allowing status offender incarceration
is a clause of the JJDPA known as the Valid Court Order (VCO) exception.70
Under the VCO exception, a state can subject a status offender to incarcera-
tion if she fails to meet the requirements of her probation.71  Although half
of all states have either banned use of the VCO exception or regularly report
no use of it, it is still used regularly in a number of states to detain status
offenders.72  In 2013, there were sixteen states where the VCO exception was
used at least 100 times, and, overall, the VCO exception was used in over
7000 cases to detain youths.73  Under the VCO exception, a status offender
who is accused of violating the conditions of his or her probation is entitled
to a hearing before the government can incarcerate him or her.74  At this
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 See 34 U.S.C. § 11133(a)(11)(A)(ii) (2012).
66 Jan C. Costello & Nancy L. Worthington, Incarcerating Status Offenders: Attempts to
Circumvent the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 41, 48
(1981).
67 See OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, supra note 3, at 2.
68 See Costello & Worthington, supra note 66, at 58.
69 See id. at 42.  These methods include utilizing the contempt powers of the court,
committing status offenders to secure mental institutions, charging an adolescent with a
crime when the underlying actions solely constitute a status offense, and detaining status
offenders in semisecure facilities. See id. at 58–80.
70 See D’lorah L. Hughes, An Overview of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act
and the Valid Court Order Exception, 642 ARK. L. NOTES 29, 35 (2011).
71 Id. at 32.
72 John Kelly, Two Big Takeaways from Latest Failure to Pass Juvenile Justice Bill, CHRON.
SOC. CHANGE (Feb. 13, 2016), https://chronicleofsocialchange.org/juvenile-justice-2/
legal-exception-on-detaining-juvenile-status-offenders-holds-up-jjdpa-bill.
73 Id.
74 CAL. BD. OF STATE & CMTY. CORR., VALID COURT ORDER (VCO) EXCEPTION CHECK-
LIST GENERAL INFORMATION (2014), http://www.bscc.ca.gov/downloads/2014_VCO_Gen-
eral_Information.pdf.
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hearing, a status offender is finally entitled to the full panoply of due process
protections that are given to juvenile delinquents.75
By that point, however, most of the damage has already been done—the
status offender has already been punished and subjected to probation.  Now
the only thing separating her from incarceration is one hearing, where, if the
court finds that she violated the terms of her probation, it can legally detain
her in a juvenile detention center.76  Initially brought to court because of an
act that was not a crime, the status offender is then subject to the same treat-
ment as a juvenile delinquent convicted of violating the law—she is housed
in the same facility and subject to the same rules, dangers, and deprivations
of liberty.  As a result, there is an increased probability that the juvenile, once
simply a status offender, will commit more serious crimes in the future.77
III. DUE PROCESS ISSUES RAISED BY THE TREATMENT OF STATUS OFFENDERS
A. Legal Framework
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution both guaran-
tee that no American citizen can be deprived “of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.”78  The Supreme Court has held that due process
has two major prongs: procedural and substantive.79  Procedural due pro-
cess, which is the focus of this Note, “concerns whether the government has
followed adequate procedures in taking away a person’s life, liberty or prop-
erty.”80  A denial of procedural due process exists, therefore, when the gov-
ernment has deprived an individual of one of these three protected interests
without adequate procedures.81
The Supreme Court uses a bifurcated test to evaluate procedural due
process claims.  Under this test, “[t]he question is . . . whether the nature of
the interest is one within the contemplation of the ‘liberty or property’ lan-
guage of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Once it is determined that due pro-
cess applies, the question remains what process is due.”82  In other words, if a
status offender choses to challenge the current state of status offender pro-
ceedings as a violation of her procedural due process rights, she would have
to prove (1) that state action (in this case, the punitive measures taken by the
state as a result of her adjudication as a status offender) resulted in depriva-
75 See id.
76 Id.
77 See Soma R. Kedia, Creating an Adolescent Criminal Class: Juvenile Court Jurisdiction over
Status Offenders, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 543, 543 (2007) (“[E]ven though
status offenders are not delinquents when they enter the court system, they often are when
they leave it.”).
78 U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1.
79 Erwin Chemerinsky, Procedural Due Process Claims, 16 TOURO L. REV. 871, 871 (2000).
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (citation omitted).  For further
description of this test, see Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Bd. of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
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tion of a liberty or property interest, and (2) that the state deprived her of
this protected interest without providing her with the process due in that
context.
B. State Punishment of Status Offenders Constitutes a Deprivation
of Liberty and Property
The first prong of the Court’s procedural due process test is itself often
divided into two main parts.  First, there must be a life, liberty, or property
interest at issue.  Second, state action must have deprived the plaintiff of that
life, liberty, or property interest.83
1. Liberty
Here, it is clear that there is a liberty interest at issue.  The Supreme
Court has long defined liberty interests broadly, as including more than sim-
ply one’s interest in not being confined.  In the 1923 case Meyer v. Nebraska,
for example, the Court stated that:
[The liberty interest] denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but
also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home
and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized . . . as
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.84
Common status offender punishments like probation and mandatory
community service clearly invoke a liberty interest: not only can these punish-
ments interfere with a status offender’s “freedom from bodily restraint,” they
also may prevent a status offender from “engaging in any of the common
occupations of life,” since they force status offenders to comply with certain
guidelines and restrictions specified by the court.  The fact that status
offenses are not technically crimes also likely creates an expectation,
grounded in state law, that liberty will be retained.85  This expectation of
liberty, although not dispositive, may create a liberty interest—especially
since status offenders are generally unsophisticated parties that are likely to
take the designation’s seeming innocuity at face value.  Indeed, the threat of
incarceration under the VCO exception following noncompliance with one’s
probation further increases the likelihood that probation itself embodies a
threat to a liberty interest.  Even though a status offender is guaranteed full
due process rights during a VCO hearing, a disposition of probation means
that the threat of incarceration, and therefore serious deprivation of liberty,
is always lurking in the background.
83 See Teitelbaum & Ellis, supra note 45, at 156.
84 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
85 See Chemerinsky, supra note 79, at 882 (“You have to look [to] the Constitution,
federal statutes, state constitutions, and state laws to determine whether there is a reasona-
ble expectation.”).
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Status offenders’ classification as juveniles does not alter this analysis, as
the Court has maintained that “children have the same liberty interests as
adults.”86  Where difficulties may arise, however,  is in the Court’s treatment
of Meyer in the 2015 case Kerry v. Din, where a plurality of the Court seemed
to reject the Meyer view, stating that “this Court is not bound by dicta.”87  It is
unlikely, though, that these comments sounded the death knell for Meyer.
Indeed, that same year, a majority of the Court cited Meyer favorably in
Obergefell v. Hodges to support its argument that the Due Process Clause pro-
tects the right to marry, as well as the right to “childrearing, procreation, and
education.”88  It may be true that the Court is not necessarily bound by dicta,
but it is also true that it is not necessarily bound by plurality opinions like
that in Kerry.  In addition, although the plurality in Kerry reads as though it is
a rejection of the Meyer view of what constitutes a liberty interest, it is likely
that the discrepancy between Kerry and Obergefell came from differences in
the two cases, rather than the Kerry plurality’s total rejection of Meyer’s expan-
sive view of the liberty interest.89
2. Property
In addition to liberty interests, status offenders may be able to argue that
the sanctions they face invoke a property interest.  Under Board of Regents of
State Colleges v. Roth, a property interest exists when there is “a reasonable
expectation [by the plaintiff] to continued receipt of a benefit.”90  The “ben-
efit” that implicates a property interest is usually defined less expansively
than the definition of the liberty interest under Meyer,91 but it is likely to
cover certain sanctions often faced by status offenders.  For example, there
are two common punishments that status offenders receive that could likely
be classified as deprivations of property: fines and suspension of one’s
driver’s license.  Both of these punishments represent reversals of a reasona-
ble expectation created by the government: the exaction of a fine overturns a
reasonable expectation in the use of one’s government-issued money, and
the suspension of one’s driver’s license overturns a reasonable expectation in
the government’s continued approval of one’s freedom to drive.
86 Teitelbaum & Ellis, supra note 45, at 158.
87 Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2134 (2015) (plurality opinion).
88 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598, 2600 (2015).
89 Namely, while Obergefell focused on the right to the actual legal union of marriage,
Kerry involved the right to enjoy the benefits of marriage—specifically, the right to live in
the same country as one’s spouse. See generally Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584; Kerry, 135 S. Ct.
2128.
90 See Chemerinsky, supra note 79, at 881 (citing Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
577 (1972)).
91 See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (holding that the plaintiff did not have a
property interest in employment).
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3. Deprivation
Establishing deprivation under the first prong of this test requires that
the plaintiff show that state action led to the loss of her liberty or property.
When juveniles bring a due process claim, however, the question of depriva-
tion becomes a difficult one because courts include an additional factor
when deciding whether the state’s action constitutes a deprivation in cases
involving juveniles: namely, “whether there is some reason for not according
a child the full freedom an adult would enjoy.”92
This does not mean that deprivation cannot be established in juvenile
cases.  On the contrary, deprivation of liberty was the due process basis for
the Court’s decision in In re Gault.93  However, status offenders are not in the
same position as the plaintiff in In re Gault; unlike a juvenile delinquent, a
status offender is not initially subject to incarceration as a result of his or her
adjudication.  In order to incarcerate a status offender, a court must comply
with all VCO requirements, including the requirement that a status offender
receive the full panoply of due process rights afforded to juvenile delin-
quents at any hearing that discusses the potential for incarceration.94  In
addition, no state defines status offenses as crimes in and of themselves;
instead, status offenses are crimes solely because the individual who commit-
ted them is a juvenile.  This fundamental difference often forms the basis for
the argument that state action does not deprive status offenders of a liberty
interest: any punishment that results from being adjudicated a status
offender is not a deprivation by the state because it does not result in a “sen-
tence of confinement.”95  Under this argument, there is a reason for not
according a child the same freedoms as an adult: namely, the child is not
charged with a crime.
Even under a broader view of the power of the state to deprive juveniles
of their liberty and property, however, it is likely that status offenders would
be able to successfully assert that a number of the sanctions they face consti-
tute deprivations.  Although status offenders have technically not committed
a crime, the fact that they are subject to many of the same sanctions as those
faced by juvenile delinquents renders this technical distinction arbitrary and
meaningless.96  This reasoning is in line with that of In re Gault, which held
that a juvenile’s status as a juvenile did not “justify a kangaroo court”97—in
92 See Teitelbaum & Ellis, supra note 45, at 160.
93 387 U.S. 1, 27, 36, 49 (1967).
94 See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text.
95 Dean Hill Rivkin & Brenda McGee, Truancy Lawyering in Status Offense Cases: An
Access to Justice Challenge, A.B.A. (Oct. 28, 2014), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/liti-
gation/committees/childrens-rights/articles/2014/truancy-lawyering-status-offense-cases-
access-to-justice-challenge/.
96 See id. (“[S]tatus offenders are often saddled with intrusive sanctions and conditions
that, for all practical purposes, are as severe as those faced by juveniles in delinquency
cases . . . .”).
97 In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 28.
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essence, the actual treatment of a juvenile plaintiff overrides technical
distinctions.
C. Most States Do Not Provide Status Offenders the Process They Are Due
The second prong of the Supreme Court’s procedural due process test is
essentially a balancing test.  Under this prong, a court first balances “the
importance of the [life, liberty, or property] interest to the individual.”98  As
the importance of the life, liberty, or property interest increases, so too does
the procedural protection owed to the plaintiff.99  The court then balances
“the ability of additional procedures to increase the accuracy of the fact find-
ing.”100  The court will order that the plaintiff be provided with those protec-
tions that are required to increase the accuracy of her adjudication.101
Finally, the court balances “the government’s interest in administrative effi-
ciency.”102  This cuts against providing additional due process protections;
the more expensive providing those protections is, the less likely the court
will require that the state provide them.
Here, it is clear that the liberty and property interests at issue are highly
important to status offenders.  Not only does a deprivation of these interests
lead to restrictions on mobility, freedom, or funds, it also could ultimately
lead to incarceration.  Second, it is likely that affording status offenders due
process rights will greatly increase the accuracy of their disposition.  The
description of the actions that lead to one’s adjudication as a status offender
can be incredibly vague; for example, a finding that a juvenile is “ungovern-
able” is commonly enough for the court to declare that a juvenile is a status
offender, but what “ungovernable” means is often unclear.103  Without due
process protection, the discretion of the judge in many status offender cases
is likely paramount.  Finally, although the government’s interest in efficiency
may cut slightly against the expansion of due process protection to status
offenders, it is clear from decisions like In re Gault that the Court does not
shy away from requiring that states take on additional burdens if due process
is at issue, as it is here.
IV. WHY STATUS OFFENDERS SHOULD BE REMOVED FROM THE JUVENILE
JUSTICE SYSTEM: STATUS OFFENDERS AS AN ILLUSTRATION
OF PARENS PATRIAE FAILURE
In many ways, the current treatment of status offenders directly mirrors
the treatment of juvenile delinquents before In re Gault and other similar
cases.  Like juvenile delinquents before In re Gault, status offenders are sub-
98 See Chemerinsky, supra note 79, at 888 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
335 (1976)).
99 Id. at 888–89.
100 Id. at 889.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 See OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, supra note 3, at 4.
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ject to punitive sanctions despite a lack of due process protections in court.
Like early juvenile delinquency proceedings, status offender proceedings are
informal, and this informality is justified by the rehabilitative rationale of
parens patriae.  And also akin to juvenile delinquents before In re Gault, status
offenders are harmed by the very system that purports to want to rehabilitate
them.
The similarities between the modern treatment of status offenders and
that of juvenile delinquents before In re Gault would seem to suggest that the
solution to the problems discussed in this Note is simply In re Gault: Status
Offender Edition.  In other words, the federal government, through either leg-
islation or the courts, should require that states guarantee status offenders
the panoply of due process protections that juvenile delinquents are cur-
rently guaranteed.  This response, however, ignores the fact that status
offenders are not an anomaly within the juvenile justice system.  Although
status offenders are arguably those most harmed by it, the rationale of parens
patriae sits at the very foundation of the juvenile justice system, and its failings
permeate any proceeding it holds that results in a punitive outcome.  In par-
ticular, there are three major ways in which the juvenile justice system’s adop-
tion of parens patriae fails adolescents.  First, it inevitably clashes with the need
to satisfy due process requirements.  Second, it is costly—both to juveniles
and to the taxpayer.  Finally, its aspirational nature gives it a staying power
that, at times, leads to other failures.  Although the failure of parens patriae
runs through the juvenile system, these three issues are particularly salient in
the status offender context.
A. The Choice Between Rehabilitation and Due Process
The juvenile justice system’s current treatment of status offenders, and
its treatment of juvenile delinquents before In re Gault, illustrates that due
process issues will inevitably develop as long as the juvenile justice system has
dual goals of rehabilitation under parens patriae and either retribution or
deterrence.  This is a result of the fact that a justice system that has retribu-
tion or deterrence as one of its goals will result in outcomes that are primarily
punitive—rehabilitative outcomes will simply not be considered adequate.  A
system whose outcomes are primarily punitive—as in, one that primarily
awards punitive rather than rehabilitative outcomes—will therefore require
due process, since these punitive outcomes are likely to result in deprivations
of life, liberty, or property.  However, rehabilitation under parens patriae
rejects due process, under the theory that these protections are not needed
because rehabilitation is the primary goal, not deterrence or retribution.104
This creates a major problem that is clearly illustrated in the status offender
context: the juvenile justice system’s goal of rehabilitation, meant to protect
status offenders, leaves this group unprotected from the harms of what many
refuse to believe is a punitive system.
104 See Smith, supra note 57, at 259 (citing a “misguided belief that status offenders are
being reformed and thus can be denied procedural protections”).
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Of course, In re Gault ushered in a number of due process protections
for juvenile delinquents, seemingly bridging the gap between the juvenile
justice system’s punitive and rehabilitative goals.  However, the concept of
parens patriae has ensured that even juvenile delinquents do not receive full
due process protections.105  As long as parens patriae is the foundation for the
juvenile system, there cannot be full due process for juvenile offenders—
whether status offenders or juvenile delinquents.
B. The Cost of Ineffective Rehabilitation
Many states’ treatment of status offenders is indicative of how incredibly
costly the faulty belief in parens patriae can be.  First, this belief is monetarily
costly.  Although data on how much money states specifically spend to adjudi-
cate status offenders is not available, one can surmise that such adjudications
cost states a great deal since they comprise almost ten percent of the cases
petitioned by juvenile courts.106  State detainment of status offenders under
the VCO exception adds an additional cost.  On any given day, approximately
2000 juveniles across the country are incarcerated as a result of a court’s use
of the VCO exception.  Although this is only two percent of the total number
of juveniles incarcerated in the United States,107 this practice still proves to
be incredibly costly.  One estimate predicts that states may spend up to $14.5
million a month incarcerating status offenders under the VCO exception.108
The belief that the court system can rehabilitate juveniles is not only
costly but also inaccurate.  Status offenders are often not rehabilitated by
their encounters with the juvenile justice system; instead, they are often
worse off.  For example, status offense proceedings for ungovernability or
running away from home, where the status offender is often in court because
her parents brought her there, may “make the dynamic between parent and
child worse and more adversarial.”109  As a result, the juvenile justice system
is not only costly to the taxpayer but also “costly” to the juveniles that it pur-
ports to rehabilitate.
C. The Fascination with Parens Patriae
The current state of the juvenile justice system requires that any
response to the due process issues faced by status offenders must require
105 See supra Section I.C.
106 In 2013, U.S. juvenile courts petitioned a total of 1,058,500 delinquency cases and a
total of 109,000 status offender cases. PUZZANCHERA & HOCKENBERRY, supra note 4, at 6, 66.
107 More than 90,000 juveniles are incarcerated per day in the United States. JUSTICE
POLICY INST., THE COSTS OF CONFINEMENT: WHY GOOD JUVENILE JUSTICE POLICIES MAKE
GOOD FISCAL SENSE 2 (2009), http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/09_05_rep_
costsofconfinement_jj_ps.pdf.
108 Id. at 3.
109 COAL. FOR JUVENILE JUSTTICE, NATIONAL STANDARDS FOR THE CARE OF YOUTH
CHARGED WITH STATUS OFFENSES 52 (2013), http://www.juvjustice.org/sites/default/files/
ckfinder/files/National%20Standards%20for%20the%20Care%20of%20Youth%20Charg
ed%20with%20Status%20Offenses%20FINAL(1).pdf.
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either the removal of status offenders from the juvenile justice system or a
radical change to the system as a whole.  However, it is clear from the way
that states have clung to the concept of parens patriae, even when it is not
effective or even popularly accepted, that any radical change to the juvenile
system is either far off or an impossibility.
This loyalty to parens patriae, and the results of that loyalty, are most obvi-
ous in the context of status offenses.  As mentioned above, the Supreme
Court has never mentioned status offenders in its opinions guaranteeing due
process rights to juvenile delinquents.110  In addition, legislators’ preference
for the status quo when it comes to status offenses has made it difficult to
advocate for even the most basic steps forward.  For example, there is consid-
erable support for phasing out the VCO exception in order to ensure that
adolescents are never subject to incarceration merely for being adjudged a
status offender.111  However, staunch supporters of the VCO exception have
stalled legislation that would allow this, ensuring that it stays on the books.112
This commitment to the status offender status quo illustrates the general
state commitment to the parens patriae ideal, even when it seems as if most of
society has rejected it.  Despite the 1990s fear of “superpredators,” for exam-
ple, when common thought was that juvenile offenders were dangerous and
deserved harsh punishment, the rationale of parens patriae was still being used
to deny status offenders full due process protections.  This ensures that the
juvenile justice system is untouched by societal or even procedural shifts.
Although society may believe juvenile offenders are dangerous delinquents,
and the group may be punished as if they are “superpredators,” the juvenile
justice system and its procedures remain largely frozen in time.
Widespread state loyalty to parens patriae provides an additional reason
for why status offenders should be removed entirely from the juvenile justice
system rather than simply given due process rights.  In short, a shift to full
due process for status offenders is not feasible.  This change would either
have to come from state legislatures or the courts, and neither has historically
been particularly open to affording status offenders adequate due process
because of their commitment to parens patriae.
D. How Should States Respond to Status Offenses?
If states decide to remove status offenders from the juvenile justice sys-
tem, what should they do with them instead?  It is important to note that
removing status offenders from the juvenile system should not be the end of
state involvement with this group.  Status offenders are a particularly vulnera-
ble category of juveniles—“poverty, abuse, [and] family breakdown . . . are
correlated with status offense behavior”—and rehabilitation of status offend-
ers is a worthwhile and important goal that states should continue to pur-
110 See generally In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
111 See Kelly, supra note 72.
112 Id.  Because of congressional support for the VCO exception, the JJDPA has not
been reauthorized since 2002. Id.
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sue.113  It is the avenue that states have chosen, not the cause, that is the
problem.  So, how should states deal with status offenders?  The most natural,
and likely the most effective, route for rehabilitation is the use of preexisting
community resources to address the root issues that cause juveniles to com-
mit status offenses in the first place.  Community-based programs targeted
toward at-risk youth have been effective in states that have adopted them—
both in assisting these adolescents and in saving the state money.  For exam-
ple, Florida adopted legislation in 1980 that created a network of community
service providers that at-risk youths and their families could access without
the need for court involvement.114  This network saved Florida approxi-
mately $160 million and reduced at-risk youths’ involvement in crime.115  In
Louisiana, the creation of a Multi-Agency Resource Center decreased the
wait time between seeking help and receiving it from fifty days or more to
only about two hours.116
Despite the success of community-based alternatives, many jurisdictions
support the status offender designation and have concerns that classifying
status offenses as crimes would lead to greater harm.  Many that support juve-
nile court jurisdiction over status offenders argue that court involvement is
necessary because the court is the only institution equipped to aid this class
of juveniles; other institutions are either nonexistent or ineffective.117  This
argument, as Judge David Bazelon argued in his essay Beyond Control of the
Juvenile Court, “is truly ironic”:
The argument for retaining beyond control and truancy jurisdiction is that
juvenile courts have to act in such cases because “if we don’t act, no one else
will.”  I submit that precisely opposite is the case: because you act, no one
else does.  Schools and public agencies refer their problem cases to you
because you have jurisdiction, because you exercise it, and because you hold
out promises that you can provide solutions.118
The irony of the argument only increases when one considers that the
time and money that states spend adjudicating status offenses is being used
ineffectively.119  Establishing community-based alternatives or strengthening
113 David J. Steinhart, Status Offenses, 6 FUTURE CHILD. 86, 96 (1996); see also ACT 4
JUVENILE JUSTICE, JUVENILE STATUS OFFENSES FACT SHEET 1, http://act4jj.org/sites/default/
files/ckfinder/files/factsheet_17.pdf (“[R]esearch indicates that risk factors for potential
truancy include domestic violence, academic problems, substance abuse, lack of parental
involvement in education, and chronic health problems.  Research also indicates that that
many youth who run away were physically or sexually abused at home in the year prior to
their runaway episode.” (footnote omitted)).
114 VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, KEEPING KIDS OUT OF COURT: RETHINKING OUR RESPONSE TO
STATUS OFFENSES (2014), http://www.modelsforchange.net/publications/648.
115 Id. For example, ninety-one percent of the adolescents served by this program in
2011–12 stayed “crime-free” for at least six months after they received services. Id.
116 Id.
117 See Kelly, supra note 72.
118 David L. Bazelon, Beyond Control of the Juvenile Court, 21 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 42, 44
(1970) (emphasis omitted).
119 See supra Section IV.B.
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those that already exist may be necessary for many states in the face of status
offenders’ removal from juvenile court; however, states are already spending
excessive funds to ineffectively accomplish what community-based alterna-
tives have been shown to effectively accomplish.  Some states are spending
money on community-based programs in this context already: numerous
states offer some kind of diversionary resources for status offenders.120
Community responses to status offenses could take many forms.  How-
ever, these responses will likely be most effective if they involve institutions
that interact with at-risk juveniles on a day-to-day basis.  Responses to truancy,
for example, should likely involve schools.  Research by the National Center
for Mental Health Promotion and Youth Violence Prevention found that the
most successful programs targeting truancy partnered schools with commu-
nity service providers and aimed at increasing the safety of the school envi-
ronment or altering the teacher response to learning disabilities rather than
punishing truants.121  Responses to status offenses that primarily involve the
family, such as ungovernability and running away from home, would best be
handled by a state’s family services department.  And underage liquor laws,
the status offense that most resembles an actual crime, should likely either be
absorbed into the juvenile delinquency designation or handled by substance
abuse programs.
CONCLUSION
Although the Supreme Court has never rejected parens patriae, in its
1966 case Kent v. United States, the Supreme Court seemed to express reserva-
tions about the parens patriae rationale.  In dicta, it stated its concern that
children in the juvenile justice system received “the worst of both worlds.”122
This statement was incredibly apt in 1966, before In re Gault, and it continues
to be applicable today—especially when it comes to the treatment of status
offenders.  In many cases, status offenders are typical adolescents, simply
pushing the boundaries of what they can get away with.  In many others, sta-
tus offenders are victims of poverty, abuse, or neglect.  Because of the vulner-
ability of many status offenders, rehabilitation of this group is a worthy goal
that states should pursue.  The problem, however, is that states are pursuing
the right goal through the wrong channels.  The juvenile justice system was
unlikely to be successful in its goal of offering rehabilitation to adolescents
when it was created in the early twentieth century, and it is even less likely to
be successful now.  This is especially true when one considers that, today,
behind the rhetoric of parens patriae often stands a fear of the “juvenile super-
predator”123—a belief that adolescents who misbehave are not doing so
120 See COAL. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 60, at 9–50.  The states that offer diver-
sionary resources for status offenders include the following: Arkansas, Arizona, Colorado,
Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Kentucky, Idaho, Maryland, Minnesota, Nebraska,
New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Texas. Id.
121 See COAL. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 109, at 62, 74.
122 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966).
123 See supra Section I.B.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-5\NDL512.txt unknown Seq: 22 25-JUN-19 15:29
2210 notre dame law review [vol. 94:5
because they are troubled, or because they are typical adolescents, but
instead because they are dangerous threats to the community.  The fact that
this belief runs deeply through the juvenile justice system is most apparent in
the status offender context.  Under the letter of the law, a status offender’s
actions are not crimes, but that status offender is treated as a criminal by the
juvenile justice system the second that a court finds her guilty.  And it is
incredibly easy for a guilty disposition to come down when the federal gov-
ernment does not require that states afford status offenders the due process
rights that the Constitution promises them.  Without these protections, it is
no wonder that courts find juveniles guilty of committing status offenses at
higher rates than they find them guilty of delinquency.124
In many cases, however, it is not only status offenders who receive the
worst of both worlds.  The juvenile justice system was built on the foundation
of parens patriae, and the effects of this rationale are found throughout the
system.  Considering the system’s treatment of status offenders simply throws
these failures into stark relief because it exemplifies the larger failures of
parens patriae.  These larger failures counsel status offenders’ removal from
the juvenile justice system, but they also demonstrate that more fundamental
changes must be made to the system as a whole in order to protect juvenile
offenders—a vulnerable class that requires rehabilitation, but not from the
courts.
124 See PUZZANCHERA & HOCKENBERRY, supra note 4, at 44.
